




Sensorimotor Chauvinism? Commentary on O'Reagan, J. Kevin and Noë, Alva, “A Sensorimotor 
account of vision and Visual Consciousness” 
 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24 (5), 2001: 979-980. 
 
 
Andy Clark and Josefa Toribio 
Cognitive and Computing Sciences 






While applauding the bulk of the account on offer, we question one apparent implication viz, that 






O'Regan and Noe present a wonderfully detailed and comprehensive defense of a position whose 
broad outline we absolutely and unreservedly endorse. They are right, it seems to us, to stress the 
intimacy of conscious content and embodied action, and to counter the idea of a Grand Illusion 
with the image of an agent genuinely in touch, via active exploration, with the rich and varied 
visual scene. This is an enormously impressive achievement, and we hope that the comments that 
follow will be taken in a spirit of constructive questioning. Overall, we have two main reservations. 
 
The first, which we are sure others will pursue in more detail, concerns the claim to have dissolved 
or side-stepped the 'hard problem' of visual qualia. Even if the contents of our conscious visual 
experiences reflect ways of acting in the world, the hard problem surely remains. A good Ping Pong 
playing robot, which uses visual input, learns about its own sensorimotor contingencies, and puts 
this knowledge into use in the service of simple goals (e.g. to win, but not by too many points) 
would meet all the constraints laid out. Yet it seems implausible to depict such a robot (and they do 
exist- see e.g. Andersson 1988) as enjoying even some kind of modest visual experience. Certainly, 
someone could buy into all that O'Regan and Noe offer as an account of how certain visual 
experiences get their contents without thinking that this in any way makes progress with the hard 
problem of why it feels like anything at all to be thus in command of a set of well-poised SMCs. 
 
But more important, to our mind, is a reservation concerning the account even as a story about the 
determination of experiential content. The worry is that by pitching the relevant SMCs at quite a 
low level (they concern, after all, such things as the precise way the retinal image shifts and distorts 
as we move our eyes etc) the authors invite a kind of sensorimotor chauvinism. By this we mean 
that they invite the conclusion that every small difference in the low-level details of sensing and 
acting will make a difference to the conscious visual experience. Thus imagine a being whose eyes 
saccade fractionally faster than our own. Some of the 'apparatus-related' SMCs will then vary. But 
will the conscious experience itself vary? (It may come quicker- but that is not the point. The 
question is: will it seem any different to the perceiver?). 
 
We are not sure how such a question is to be resolved one way or the other. But there seems no a 
priori reason to believe that every difference in SMC's will make a difference to the experienced 
content, even if the SMCs (some of them, at some level) are indeed active in determining the 
content (compare, e.g., work on discriminable Vs non-discriminable differences in color). 
 
Moreover, though we cannot defend this view in detail here (see Clark (forthcoming)), there is 
some evidence to suggest that conscious visual experience is rather deeply tied up with the uptake 
of information in a form geared not to fine-tuned sensorimotor control but to memory, thought, 
reason and planning (think of a somewhat weakened version of the dual visual systems hypothesis 
defended by Milner and Goodale (1995), and indeed mentioned by O'Regan and Noe). To whatever 
extent this is the case, it may be that the need to put the SMCs to use in the service of planning, 
reason and intentional action (a need properly stressed by the authors) serves as a kind of filter on 
the type and level of the SMCs especially relevant to conscious visual experience. The suspicion is 
thus that the important links between action and conscious visual content are mediated (and for 
more on this, see Prinz (2000)) by systems geared towards memory, planning and reason.  
 
The challenge, then, is for the authors to either refute the charge of sensorimotor chauvinism, or to 
show convincingly that every difference in SMC (both apparatus -related and object-related) yields 
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